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COMMENTARIES
The Future of Election Reform
By HERBERT E. ALEXANDER*
Introduction
Election reform is at a crossroads. A priority issue in the Water-
gate-dominated 1970's, reform has lost a good deal of its luster, ac-
cented by the 1980 election and the elements of deregulation and
counterreform it brought to Washington. Following the 1980 election,
the policies that characterized the reform movementl-imitations on
contributions and campaign expenditures, public funding of presiden-
tial campaigns, and establishment of the Federal Election Commission
(FEC)-were attacked by counterreformers in Congress, the media and
the executive branch. Only the portions of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act (FECA)2 providing for comprehensive and timely disclosure
of political funds were reasonably safe from anti-regulatory attack.
The role of the reformer during most of the Ninety-seventh Congress
was largely defensive. Further aspects of the reformers' agenda that
had once seemed possible to enact-aggregate limits on contributions
federal candidates can receive from political action committees (PACs)
and public funding of congressional elections-appeared to be farther
away than ever.
* Director, Citizens' Research Foundation, University of Southern California. B.A.,
1949, University of North Carolina; M.A., 1951, University of Connecticut; Ph.D., 1958,
Yale University.
1. For discussions of these reforms, see generally H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE
1972 ELECTION (1976); H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1976 ELECTION (1979); H. ALEX-
ANDER, FINANCING THE 1980 ELECTION (1983); and H. ALEXANDER & B. HAGGERTY, THE
FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT: AFTER A DECADE OF REFORM (1981).
2. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972); Reve-
nue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497; Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263; Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475; Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1980).
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Counterreform took shape in the form of efforts to reduce the ex-
tent of government regulation of the electoral process, to lighten the
burdens the law imposed on candidates and political committees by
reducing paperwork, to raise contribution limits or to repeal them en-
tirely, and to restrict some of the powers of the FEC or abolish it alto-
gether. A regulatory rollback has been attempted in Congress,3 in the
courts,4 and within the regulatory structure itself.' But by the 1982
midterm elections, there appeared to be new interest in aspects of re-
form, spawned by a number of media reports that brought to the pub-
lie's attention the increasing cost of campaigns and the growing
importance of political action committees in federal elections.
Indeed, growth in the number of PACs6 and in the amounts of
money raised and spent on federal election campaigns continued dur-
ing the 1981-82 election cycle. Data available through the end of 1982
indicate increases of approximately fifty percent over the 1979-80 cycle
in both PAC expenditures and in PAC contributions to congressional
candidates.7 In the 1979-80 election cycle, PACs raised and spent more
money and contributed more to federal candidates than in the two pre-
vious election cycles combined.' Although these increases occurred un-
3. Legislation seeking to weaken the FECA introduced in the 97th Congress included
S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess, authored by Sen. Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.), which would severely
curtail the FEC's authority to interpret federal election law; S. 1899, authored by Sen. Arlen
Specter (R-Pa.), which sought to reduce the FEC to a part-time agency; H.R. 2604 and H.R.
986, authored by Rep. Larry McDonald (D-Ga.), which sought to abolish the FEC. Another
bill to do away with the agency was slated to be introduced in the 98th Congress by Sen.
Roger Jepson (R-Iowa).
4. Two cases of long duration that could restrict federal election law are Bread Polit-
ical Action Comm. v. FEC, 678 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1982), in which plaintiff seeks to overturn
the restrictions placed upon trade associations in soliciting funds for their PACs, and Athens
Lumber Co. v. FEC, 718 F.2d 363 (1 1th Cir. 1983), which focuses on whether the restriction
placed upon corporate contributions to federal candidates should be overturned.
5. The most notable example involved an advisory opinion request made to the FEC
by Rexnord, Inc., which asked if it could legally pay for an advertisement in a general
circulation newspaper carrying the message "Please Register to Vote." In AO 1979-48, the
FEC replied that while Rexnord's PAC could legally pay for the ad. the corporation itself
could not. Rexnord, however, pressed the matter, and in AO 1980-20 the commission re-
versed itself by ruling that the action was permissible.
6. The explosive growth of PACs had been recorded by a number of sources, including
the FEC. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n, PACs Increase in Number, Press Release (Jan.
14, 1983) (the total number of PACs registered with the FEC rose to 3,371 at the end of 1982
from 608 in 1974). For an impartial long-range analysis of PAC growth, see J. CANTOR,
POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES: THEIR EVOLUTION AND GROWTH AND THEIR IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (Congressional Research Service, 1982).
7. See Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Publishes Final 1981-82 PA4C Study, Press Release
(Nov. 29, 1983).
8. See Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Releases Final PAC Report/or 1979-80 Election
Cycle, Press Release (Feb. 21, 1982).
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evenly, rises have occurred in every category of PAC operation:
ideological, single-issue, corporate, trade, labor, health, and
membership.9
Although it is difficult to predict which election law proposals, if
any, will find success in the Ninety-eighth Congress, it is possible to
define the broad contours of future election law by reviewing the pa-
rameters set down by the United States Supreme Court when it has
dealt with election laws. Within these confines, political reality affects
the legislative outlook.
1. Principal Cases Governing Election Reform
A. Buckley v. Valeo
The high water mark of federal election reform was the enactment
of the 1974 Amendments to the FECA, passed by Congress under the
cloud of Watergate and signed into law by President Ford on October
15, 1974.10 Among other things, the amendments provided for the
following:
(1) a six-member, full time bipartisan Federal Election Commis-
sion with the President, Speaker of the House, and President Pro Tem
of the Senate each appointing two members of different parties, all sub-
ject to confirmation by Congress;"
(2) limits on individual contributions to federal candidates of
$1,000 for each primary, run-off or general election and of $25,000 total
per calendar year;12
(3) limits on contributions by political committees and party or-
ganizations of $5,000 per election; 13
(4) contribution limits on candidates or their families of $50,000
for presidential candidates, $35,000 for Senate, candidates, and $25,000
for House candidates; 14
(5) limits on independent expenditures for a candidate of
$I,000;11
9. Id at 3.
10. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263. For a complete legislative history of the 1974
FECA Amendments, see FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (1977).
11. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (1974).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(3) (1974).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 608(v)(2) (1974).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1)(A)-(C) (1974).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(2)(B) (1974).
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(6) limits on expenditures by presidential prenomination candi-
dates of $10 million in the prenomination period and $20 million dur-
ing the general election period under a formula by which candidates
receive public matching funds during the primary period and major
party candidates receive public block grants during the general
election; 1
6
(7) a subsidy of up to two million dollars for the presidential
nominating conventions of the major parties; 7
(8) expenditure limits on Senate and House candidates;',
(9) full disclosure of all contributors of more than one hundred
dollars and a record of the names and addresses of all contributors of
more than ten dollars. 19
Various provisions drew immediate protest from a broad cross sec-
tion of persons who felt the amendments, however well-intentioned,
created a chilling effect on free speech and citizen participation. An
unusual provision of the law authorized any eligible voter to contest the
constitutionality of any provision of the law and permitted the chal-
lenge to be certified directly to the Federal Court of Appeals, which
was obliged to expedite the case.20
In Buckley v. Valeo,21 the Supreme Court sought to balance the
First Amendment rights of free speech and free association against the
power of the Congress to enact laws designed to protect the integrity of
federal elections. The central question posed by Justice Stewart during
oral argument was whether money is speech.22 The Court reasoned:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can
spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
16. 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1974).
17. 26 U.S.C. § 9008(d) (1974).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(C)-(E) (1974).
19. 2 U.S.C. § 432(c)(2), 434(b)(2) (1974).
20. 2 U.S.C. § 437h (1974).
21. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). In pertinent part, the suit attacked the FECA's
limits on contributions and expenditures, disclosure provisions, public financing, and limita-
tions on independent political activity.
Plaintiffs included both liberals and conservatives, individuals and organizations;
among them were Senator James Buckley (R-N.Y.), Eugene J. McCarthy, a former Demo-
cratic senator from Minnesota, and Stewart R. Mott, a large contributor. Defendants in-
cluded Secretary of the Senate Francis R. Valeo, the Attorney General, the FEC, the Clerk
of the House, and three reform groups: Common Cause, the Center for Public Financing of
Elections, and the League of Women Voters.
22. 424 U.S. at 16. See also Wright, Politics and the Constitution. Is Money Speech?, 85
YALE L.J. 1001 (1976) (critique of the Supreme Court's treatment of Buckley v. Valeo).
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audience reached. This is because virtually every means of com-
municating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure
of money.23
With that determined, it was only a short step for the Court to find
the expenditure limitations of the Act to be a substantial, rather than
merely theoretical, restraint on the quantity and diversity of political
speech. The Court thus gave broad First Amendment protection to
spending by individuals or groups for political messages intended to
become part of the public interchange of political ideas. The Court
held unconstitutional FECA limits on candidates' spending on their
own behalf, total campaign spending, and independent expenditures
made by individuals or groups advocating the election or defeat of a
candidate for federal office.24 The Court allowed some room for regu-
lation by ruling that overall candidate expenditure limits were permis-
sible under an optional public funding program: candidates who
accepted the public funds for their campaigns could be obligated to
accept expenditure limits as a condition of the grants.25 The Court also
ruled that expenditures coordinated with a candidate or campaign re-
ceive less than full First Amendment protection and may be subject to
regulation.26
On one hand, the Court acknowledged the right of Congress to
regulate federal elections and recognized the FECA's express purpose
of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption as a legiti-
mate governmental interest.27 The Court concluded that the limits on
individual and group contributions to campaigns presented only a mar-
ginal restriction on free speech, and so upheld those provisions of the
Act.28 On the other hand, the Court did not agree that the law's secon-
dary purpose-to equalize candidates' financial resources-was com-
pelling enough to warrant a restriction on free speech.29
23. 424 U.S. at 19. The Supreme Court's analysis differed significantly from that of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed many
important provisions of the FECA that had been considered and upheld by the Circuit
Court. For a discussion on how the two approaches diverged and how their conclusions
differed, see Shockley, Money in Politics: Judicial Roadblocks to Campaign Finance Reform,
10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 679, 690-91 (1983).
24. 424 U.S. at 5 1.
25. Id at 107-08; see also id at 57 n.65.
26. Id at 48; see also id at 47 n.53.
27. Id at 27-28.
28. Id at 28-29.
29. Id at 48-49. Proponents of this argument contended that some speech had to be
restricted in order to enhance the opportunity for expression by opposing groups.
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Table 1
Provisions of the FECA Upheld and Struck Down in
Buckley v. Valeo
Upheld Struck Down
$1,000 personal contribution
limit
$5,000 limit on PAC contribu-
tions
Provisions for in-kind contribu-
tions
$25,000 aggregate annual per-
sonal contribution ceiling
Presidential matching fund and
general election public finance
provisions
$5,000 limitation on party com-
mittee contributions
Partial disclosure of contribu-
tions in excess of $10 and full
disclosure of contributions of
more than $100 to candidates,
PACs and party committees
Disclosure of independent
expenditures in excess of $100
Existence of the Federal Elec-
tion Commission
a Reinstated for Presdiential and Vice
Amendments of 1976.
$1,000 limit on independent
expenditures
Limits on money candidates can
put into their own campaigns:
$50,000, President or Vice Presi-
dent;a $35,000, Senate; $25,000,
House
Aggregate limits on campaign
expenditures: $20 million, presi-
dential; $150,000 or 12 cents per
eligible voter (whichever is
greater), Senate; $70,000, House
Aggregate limits on primary
campaign expenditures: $10 mil-
lion, presidential; $100,000 or 8
cents per eligible voter (which-
ever is greater), Senate; $70,000,
House
$2 million expenditure limitation
on major party conventions
Appointment procedure for Fed-
eral Election Commission com-
missioners
Presidential candidates only by the FECA
In sum, the financial provisions of the Act were upheld if they
were found to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption, and
rejected if they merely sought to equalize resources (See Table 1). The
Court also upheld the disclosure provisions of the Act as a deterrence
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to actual corruption or the appearance of corruption."0 The Court's
decision in Buckley has shaped succeeding election law cases and regu-
lation at the federal, state, and local levels.3
Also called into question in Buckley was the existence of the FEC.
The appellants argued that the procedure for selecting the agency's
commissioners was unconstitutional.32 They claimed that since the
FEC was given broad rulemaking and enforcement powers, Congress
could not, under the doctrine of separation of powers, vest in itself the
authority of appointment.33 The Constitution states that
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint. . . all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise pro-
vided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Con-
gress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers,
as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments.3
4
The appellants argued that the Commission's regulatory and enforce-
ment powers made it an independent agency of the type that is nor-
mally under the authority of "Officers of the United States," and
therefore the commissioners should be appointed by the President, with
confirmation by the Senate.35 The Court agreed with this strict inter-
30. Id at 67.
31. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981);
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); California Medical Ass'n v. FEC,
641 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1980).
32. Provisions of the FECA affected were 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1)(A)-(C) (1974). 424 U.S.
at 118-19. According to the provisions of the 1974 Amendments, the FEC was to have eight
commissioners. The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House were non-voting ex
officio members. Two members were appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate
"upon the recommendations of the majority leader of the Senate and the minority leader of
the Senate." Id at 113 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1)(A) (1974)). Two other members were
appointed by the Speaker of the House, again upon the recommendations of its majority and
minority leaders. Id The final two members were appointed by the President. Id Each of
the six voting members was subject to confirmation by the majority of both houses of Con-
gress and each of the three appointing authorities were forbidden from selecting both of
their appointees from the same party. Id- Congress justified this unusual process by noting
the unique role of the FEC as a body which regulated federal elections. 424 U.S. at 109.
33. 424 U.S. at 120-21.
34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
35. 424 U.S. at 118-19. The appellees argued that the Appointments Clause should be
interpreted to include the inherent power of Congress to appoint its own officers to perform
functions necessary to it as an institution. Id at 127. They argued that the legislative au-
thority conferred upon Congress in art. I, § 4, to regulate "the Times, Places and Manner of
Holding Elections for Senators and Representatives," is augmented by art. I, § 5, which
states that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its
own Members." 424 U.S. at 133.
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pretation of the Appointments Clause. 6 It granted past acts of the
FEC de facto validity and gave a thirty-day stay in which Congress
could reconstitute the FEC without the damaging effects of an abrupt
cessation of activities.37
B. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
At issue in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,3 8 was a Massa-
chusetts General Law prohibiting campaign expenditures by corpora-
tions in ballot elections, except for those elections in which the outcome
would materially affect the corporations' property, business or assets.3 9
The Supreme Court focused not on the First Amendment rights of cor-
porations, but upon the rights of society at large to hear political
messages.4' Writing for the majority, Justice Powell ruled that political
messages deserve the full protection of the First Amendment. Noting
that political speech is "indispensable to decisionmaking in a democ-
racy," Powell concluded, "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of
its capacity for informing the public does not depend on the identity of
its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual."',
Several rules pertaining to the constitutional underpinnings of fu-
ture political campaign reform may be distilled from the Court's deci-
sions in Buckley and Bellotti:
36. Id at 125.
37. Id at 142-43. Although the Court required appointment of all members of the com-
mission by the President within the 30-day stay period, the actual reconstitution of the FEC
by the Congress took 111 days. When Congress failed to act within the 30-day period, a
delay of an additional 20 days was granted by the Court. Congress again failed to act; the
FEC consequently lost its executive authority, including the power to enforce election law
and certify payments of matching funds to candidates then seeking their party's presidential
nomination. The 1976 Amendments to the FECA reconstituted the FEC in accordance with
the standards applied by the Supreme Court: the President appointed the FEC members
who then were confirmed by the Senate. FECA Amendments of 1976, supra note 10, (codi-
fied as 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (1982)).
38. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
39. The statute at issue was MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West 1975), which
prohibited corporations from making contributions or expenditures "for the purpose of...
influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one
materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation."
40. 435 U.S. at 775-76. The majority approached the issue as follows: "The Constitu-
tion often protects interests broader than those of the party seeking their vindication. The
First Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal interests. The proper question
therefore is not whether corporations 'have' First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they
are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be whether [the
Massachusetts statute] abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect."
Id at 776.
41. Id. at 777.
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(1) reform that seeks to prevent corruption or the appearance of
corruption may justify a marginal infringement on free speech;
(2) reform that primarily seeks to equalize campaign resources
cannot infringe free speech rights; however, campaign expenditure lim-
its can be linked to acceptance of optional public funding;
(3) political messages, in and of themselves, are valued and pro-
tected in a democratic polity; regulations that restrict political messages
infringe upon society in general and will be subjected to the utmost
scrutiny. The right to hear messages and the right to have one's
messages heard are separate First Amendment rights in addition to the
right to speak.
C. Post-Buckley Cases Challenging the Constitutionality of FECA
Provisions
I. California Medical Association v. FEC
An investigation led the FEC to believe that the California Medi-
cal Association (CMA) had violated the FECA by making both direct
and in-kind contributions to California Medical PAC (CALPAC), its
political action committee, in excess of the $5,000 legal limit.42 Antici-
pating an FEC enforcement action, the two medical groups filed suit
against the commission in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.43 The
medical groups argued that the ceiling on contributions to multicandi-
date political committees by "persons" unduly infringed upon their
First Amendment rights of free speech and association because the
limit restricted the CMA's ability to engage in political speech through
its PAC.' CMA also asserted that the money, materials, and services it
gave to CALPAC were intended to be used in the same way in which
corporate and union treasury money can be used to administer a
PAC.45 The medical organization argued that if the statute did not give
CMA the right to make the same kind of expenditures permitted to
corporations and labor organizations, then the law violated the group's
42. The $5,000 contribution ceiling is set forth in 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (1976). The
in-kind contributions were in the form of administrative and support services. The FEC
contended that the total value of the contributions was approximately $97,000 in 1976,
$104,000 in 1977, and $136,000 in 1978. Mann, $5,000 Limit on Political Gif/s Upheld, L.A.
Times, June 27, 1981, at 3, col. 3.
43. California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 641 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1980). The case was heard
before the Court of Appeals sitting en banc per 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a)(1976), which requires that
all questions concerning the constitutionality of the FECA be heard by such a court.
44. 641 F.2d at 623.
45. Id at 629. Corporations and unions are authorized by 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)(2)(C)
(1976) to use their treasury money to administer a PAC without the constraint of the contri-
bution limitations.
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constitutional rights of freedom of association and equal protection.46
In California MedicalAssociation v. FEC (CMA4 v. FEC)4 7 both the
Court of Appeals4" and the Supreme Court rejected the medical
group's constitutional challenges. A plurality of the Court relied on
Buckley to uphold the constitutionality of contribution limits based on
the need to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption. 49 A
majority of the Court held that Congress could establish different rules
for unincorporated associations, labor unions, and corporations with-
out violating the Equal Protection Clause."0 The Court reasoned that
each organization has a different structure and purpose, therefore, each
requires a different form of regulation in order to protect the integrity
of the electoral process.51
2. Mott v. Federal Election Commission
In late 1979, a politically incongruous coalition of individuals and
groups began to file a series of lawsuits challenging FECA limits on
contributions. 52 In Mot v. Federal Election Commission,5 3 the plaintiffs
sought to strike down all limits on contributions to persons or groups
making independent expenditures. They contended that by regulating
the amount of money that may be contributed to groups making in-
dependent expenditures, the FEC had ignored the Court's holding in
Buckley that direct restraints on independent political activity are
unconstitutional.5 4
46. 641 F.2d at 629.
47. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
48. 641 F.2d at 623.
49. 453 U.S. at 194-95 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-38).
50. 453 U.S. at 200-01.
51. Id. at 201.
52. Office of former Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, Left/Right Coalition Launches New
Legal Assault on Campaign Act, Press Release, Dec. 17, 1979. In a formal statement the
coalition members noted that although they often disagreed with each other on major polit-
ical issues, they believed the FECA reduces "the amount of debate, information and ideas
available to the voting public." Id at 4. The statement was signed by five individuals--
James Buckley, Gordon Humphrey, Eugene McCarthy, Stewart Mott and Rhonda Stahl-
man-and by seven organizations-the Citizens' Party, the Committee for a Constitutional
Presidency, the Conservative Victory Fund, the Libertarian Party, the National Conserva-
tive PAC, the Ripon Society and Young Americans for Freedom.
53. 494 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. 1980).
54. 494 F. Supp. at 135-36. Plaintiff Stewart Mott planned "to join other like-minded
individuals" in an independent promotion of their views on the 1980 presidential campaign.
Id at 133. Mott was concerned that their activities would lead the FEC to consider them a
political committee subject to all legal restrictions governing PACs. Id. at 133, 135. The
complaint was dismissed as to Mott due to a ripeness problem and because he had not first
sought an advisory opinion from the FEC asking whether the joint activity he wished to
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The district court disagreed, reasoning that money transferred to
the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) to en-
able the Committee to speak receives less constitutional protection than
direct expenditures. 5 Noting the concern of Congress that the PACs
would become the means for avoiding the limits on direct contributions
to candidates, the district court concluded that Buckley and the Ninth
Circuit's CMA4 opinion put the contribution limitations beyond
challenge. 6
3. Republican National Committee v. FEC
The 1974 FECA Amendments gave major party presidential nom-
inees the option of receiving a flat sum of money from the government
to conduct their campaigns on the condition that they not accept or
spend funds from any other source.5 7 The Republican National Com-
mittee (RNC) filed suit, charging that it was unconstitutional to require
presidential candidates who accept public funding for their general
election campaigns to adhere to a spending ceiling. 8
The GOP challenge was based primarily on the finding in Buckley
that limits on campaign spending substantially and directly restricted
the ability of candidates, citizens and associations to engage in pro-
tected political expression. 9 The RNC claimed that the restriction vio-
lated its members' First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and
freedom of association, as well as their Fifth Amendment right to due
process, by restricting the amount a candidate could spend while en-
gaging in political speech, by limiting the amount a candidate's sup-
porters could spend in grassroots activity, and by preventing a
candidate's supporters from demonstrating their support by contribut-
ing to his or her campaign. 0 Furthermore, the Republicans claimed
that the spending limit imposed as a condition of accepting public
undertake would require him and his like-minded associates to register as a PAC. Id at
135.
Plaintiff Rhonda StahlIman sought to donate more than $5,000 to the National Con-
servative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) to support its independent expenditure pro-
grams without having the contribution count against the overall limit on contributions of
$25,000. Id at 133.
55. 494 F. Supp. at 137.
56. Id (citing CMA v. FEC, 641 F.2d 619 (1980), affd, 453 U.S. 182 (1981)).
57. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b)(1)(B) (1974); see also 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a) (1974).
58. Republican Nat'1 Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.), a'd, 445 U.S. 955
(1980).
59. 487 F. Supp. at 286; See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-21.
60. 487 F. Supp. at 286-87.
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funds gives the incumbent a considerable advantage over challengers.61
The RNC also contended that the presidential election system is
skewed permanently in favor of Democratic presidential candidates,
who have historically won the support of organized labor.62 The
Republicans requested that federal subsidies be maintained at the level
specified in the FECA and that both parties be allowed to spend all
they could raise in small contributions.63
In a unanimous decision, the Second Circuit, meeting en banc, re-
jected the RNC's contentions and upheld the constitutionality of the
spending limit.64 The circuit court adopted the findings and conclu-
sions of a three-judge district court which reasoned that public funding
promotes rather than inhibits freedom of speech because it frees candi-
dates from the burden of fundraising; as a result candidates can con-
centrate on communicating their stands on public issues and are freed
from dependence on large private contributions.65 The district court
added that the statutory scheme respects First Amendment rights be-
cause it allows a candidate's supporters to express support by donations
of personal services and through independent expenditures. 66 The dis-
trict court found that the conditional spending limit does not dispro-
61. Id at 287. The RNC maintained that by holding office the incumbent engages in
activities that influence the outcome of an election but that are not affected by the spending
limit: a President is able to attract media attention simply by conducting the nation's busi-
ness; an incumbent's programs are based on research and expertise provided by the execu-
tive branch staff at no cost to the incumbent's re-election campaign. Id
62. Id at 287-88. According to the Republicans, the terms of the FECA give special
privileges to organized labor, including the right to spend unlimited amounts of general
treasury funds on political communications to union members and their families. Id at 288.
In 1976, unions spent about $11 million on such communications for Jimmy Carter, whereas
corporations spent only a fraction of that amount for President Ford. Id at 294-95.
63. Id at 292. The RNC reasoned that this remedy would aliow the Republican party
to collect the funds needed to offset the Democrats' advantages of incumbency and the
FECA provisions favoring labor unions. Id at 287-89.
64. RNC v. FEC, 616 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir.), affid, 445 U.S. 955 (1980) (per curiam). The
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York heard the RNC's suit concur-
rently with the Second Circuit. This unusual procedural posture was the result of overlap-
ping provisions in the FECA assigning jurisdiction. Title 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (1978) requires
that all constitutionality challenges to the FECA are to be certified by a single-judge district
court to the Court of Appeals sitting en banc. See RNC v. FEC, 461 F. Supp. 570, 575-76
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) aff'd 445 U.S. 955 (1980) (per curiam). Title 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b) (1954)
authorizes a three-judge federal district court to "implement and construe" any provision of
the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, ch. 95, subtit. H of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013. See RNC v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 281, 282 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). The three-judge panel dismissed the causes of action presented by the RNC. Id at
289. The Second Circuit responded to the questions certified by the single-judge district
court by adopting the reasoning of the three-judge district court. 616 F.2d at 2.
65. 616 F.2d at 2; 487 F. Supp. at 283-84.
66. 487 F. Supp. at 284.
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portionately favor an incumbent President.67 The district court also
ruled that the advantages the FECA granted to unions were balanced
by similar advantages granted to corporations.68
D. Post-Bellotti Cases Expanding Corporations' First Amendment
Rights
In Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission,69 the
Supreme Court held that a New York statute preventing utilities from
including inserts advocating nuclear power in customers' monthly bills
violated the First Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell
rejected the argument that the "captive audience" of utility users
needed to be protected by regulation from corporate messages. "Where
a single speaker communicates to many listeners, the First Amendment
does not permit the government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless
the 'captive' audience cannot avoid objectionable speech. '70 Powell
concluded that those receiving their bills could avoid the message of
the inserts by averting their eyes.7 1
In Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley,72 the Supreme
Court further broadened the First Amendment protection afforded cor-
porations. The Court held invalid a Berkeley, California municipal or-
dinance limiting to $250 corporate contributions to ballot issue
committees. In affirming Bellotti, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote
that a key reason for overturning the ordinance was that it imposed
limitations on individual expenditures, and thus was a restraint on the
right of association.73
To the three principles shaping future campaign reform flowing
from the Buckley and Bellotti decisions, 74 can be added a fourth crite-
rion: the speech of corporations and groups may be no more restricted
than that of individuals under the First Amendment, provided that cor-
67. Id at 303-04. The court pointed out that in the previous election, the incumbent,
President Ford, was defeated. Id.
68. Id at 305-06. The court thus assumed that if labor unions are considered to be
affiliated with the Democratic Party, then corporations should be aligned with the Republi-
cans. The court also noted that organized labor support of Democratic candidates is not
automatic, and that President Carter was not especially popular with organized labor. Id
69. 447 U.S. 530, 532 (1980).
70. Id at 541-42.
71. Id at 542.
72. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
73. Id at 296. For a more extensive discussion of Citizens Against Rent Control, see
Note, Independent Expenditures: Can Survey Research Establish a Link to Declining Citizen
Confidence in Government?, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 763 (1983).
74. See supra text, following note 41.
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ruption or the appearance of corruption is not a major factor. These
four criteria outline the legal parameters within which future election
reform may develop. The task for reformers is to draft legislation
channeling money into structures that respect the right of association
under conditions that reduce the possibility of corruption or the ap-
pearance of corruption.
II. Party Reform to Effect Election Reform
Reformers continue to seek election legislation to address the fol-
lowing concerns: reducing the strength of PACs; equalizing campaign
resources among rich and poor candidates, as well as among incum-
bents and challengers; encouraging participation and contributions
from broader constituencies; countering the imbalances caused by spe-
cial interest politics; and facilitating the mobilization of effective con-
gressional majorities in order to enact public policies. These concerns
can be addressed without infringing on the legal restrictions imposed
by Buckley, Bellotti, and their progeny through the reinvigoration of
political parties.
The Republican Party has demonstrated strong signs of revitaliza-
tion through the development of a solid financial base and by engaging
in a variety of activities to assist and recruit candidates.75 In the after-
math of the 1980 election, in which the Democrats lost thirty-four seats
in the House, relinquished control of the Senate for the first time since
1954, and lost the presidency, the Democratic National Committee has
shown that it is beginning the process of renewal.76
While the leadership of the Republican National Committee and
the Democratic National Committee have sown the seeds of party re-
newal, the Supreme Court has provided fertile ground in which the
parties may grow. In Cousins v. Wigoda," the Supreme Court held that
the rules of a national political party prevail over conflicting state laws
regulating the seating of delegates at political conventions. The Court
75. For a description of the revival of the Republican Party, see Adamany, Political
Finance and the American Political Parties, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 497, 537-40 (1983).
76. Id at 540-41.
77. 419 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1975). During the 1972 Democratic convention an Illinois
delegation headed by Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley was accused of violating a party rule
forbidding slate-making. The Daley forces obtained a state court order barring their re-
moval based on a statute preventing replacement of delegates elected in conformity with
Illinois law. The court order was ignored, and a delegation favoring George McGovern was
seated after winning a credentials fight on the convention floor. After the convention,
Daley's lawyers pressed for contempt citations against the McGovern backers, but were
thwarted by a stay order from the Supreme Court. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
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reasoned that there was no compelling governmental interest which
justified such an intrusion into the associational rights of the party
members.78 This decision is significant because it strengthens parties
by allowing them freedom to structure and discipline their organiza-
tions without state interference.
The national parties were also aided by the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Democratic Party of the United States v. La Follette." The Court
held that the state interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral
process by keeping secret a voter's party affiliation was not sufficiently
compelling to warrant interference with the national party requirement
of a "closed primary."80 The majority ruled that neither a state nor a
court may constitutionally substitute its own judgment for that of a
political party in determining the makeup of the state's delegation to
the party's national convention.8 1
The Supreme Court's decisions in Cousins and La Follette offer
the parties the latitude they need to determine when presidential
primaries should be conducted, whether they should be statewide or
regional, and whether delegate selection should return to the caucus
system. Although these decisions seem to have opened the door for a
reform movement led by the national parties, such optimism should be
tempered by a degree of caution, as both cases dealt with national party
conventions and not with other aspects of party autonomy or power.
The extent of the parties' permissible autonomy probably would be de-
lineated by litigation over the validity of reforms strengthening parties,
if such legislation were enacted.
Several proposals have been made to help reestablish parties so
that they can perform their historic tasks of mediating between individ-
uals, organized groups and government, facilitating the construction of
effective congressional majorities, and promoting coherent public pol-
icy. These proposals are of two types. The first type applies to presi-
78. 419 U.S. at 489-90.
79. 450 U.S. 107 (1981), rev'g 93 Wis. 2d 473, 287 N.W.2d 519.
80. 450 U.S. at 124-26. The Wisconsin presidential primary had been "open" since
1903-voters could cross party lines and cast their ballots for any candidate. The rules of
the Democratic Party allow only those voters willing to publicly identify themselves as Dem-
ocrats to participate in the delegate selection process. Id at 127.
81. Id at 123-24.
82. For a discussion of the role of political parties in democracies, see Adamany, supra
note 75, at 500-05.
Several factors have contributed to the decline of political parties in recent decades: the
replacement of party-controlled patronage by civil service, the ascendance of the mass me-
dia as a means of reaching voters, a more highly educated electorate, and the democratiza-
tion of the presidential nominating process. See generally Adamany, supra note 75, at 506-
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dential campaigns only, and follows from the Supreme Court's
protection of the integrity of national political parties in Cousins and
La Follette. This class of proposals focuses on reform within the par-
ties themselves. For example, the Democratic Party's Hunt Commis-
sion recommended that the national conventions become more
deliberative bodies, and that more party officials and officeholders be
selected as convention delegates. The purpose of these recommenda-
tions is to give the party leadership greater control over the selection of
its presidential nominee.83
The second type of proposal seeks reform by making the following
changes in the Federal Election Campaign Act: eliminate or substan-
tially increase limits on party committee spending on behalf of candi-
dates; eliminate or substantially increase limits on contributions to
parties and on what parties may contribute to candidate committees;
extend to national party committees the permission state and local
party committees have to spend unlimited amounts on grassroots activ-
ity on behalf of presidential candidates;84 exempt legal, accounting and
administration expenses by parties from the FECA definitions of "con-
tribution" and "expenditure"; and provide a tax credit for small con-
tributors to political parties.
The goal of the second class of proposals is to provide parties with
more money. Greater financial resources would strengthen parties in
several ways. Party funding would be an incentive for candidates to
support party programs. It might also wean candidates from PAC con-
tributions and thus diminish the fragmentation associated with special
interest politics.
These *changes also would allow parties to assist candidates
through provision of services and modern campaign technology. Par-
ties can provide economies of scale by pooling computer, polling, and
other campaign services for party candidates. Such party assistance
would diminish the dependence candidates have on PAC contributions
and would reduce the need for private campaign consultants.
In every society that has free elections, someone must foot the bil.
Sources of funds other than parties have been necessary because parties
have been unable to supply enough financial assistance. When candi-
15. In the wake of party decline, American politics has become excessively candidate-ori-
ented: candidates offer themselves to the electorate, build their own media and organiza-
tional campaigns, and raise their own money. After conducting their own campaigns,
candidates may feel little gratitude to their parties once elected.
83. For a discussion of the Hunt Commission and its recommendations, see H. ALEX-
ANDER, FINANCING THE 1980 ELECTION 456 (1983).
84. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(a)(B)(iv), (viii), (ix) (1976) (amended 1979).
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dates are unable to adequately finance a campaign from their constitu-
ents, they seek funds from PACs, lobbyists, and out-of-state
sympathizers, or they use their personal resources.8 5 By increasing the
ability of the parties to obtain funding, the traditional functions of par-
ties will be restored, and the degenerative effects caused by PAC and
interest group financing will be diminished.
III. The Proper Role of PACs in Election Law Reform
American politics is shifting from neighborhood precincts to socio-
economic bases representing common ideologies.86 People give to a
PAC because they share its ideas and concerns, and they seek to elect
candidates with congenial views. This method of funding tends to na-
tionalize politics because it directs candidates to national issues and
away from the provincial interests of a state or district.87 To the degree
that public policy is formulated in Washington rather than in state and
local communities, a trend toward nationalization of campaign fund-
raising is inevitable. As government has expanded and increased its
role in the economy and in social issues, affected interest groups have
become more active in politics. In general, the greater the impact of
decisions made by the federal government, the more people are likely
to be interested in politics and in organizing PACs.
The campaign reform laws of the 1970's sought to curtail the influ-
ence of interest groups. Ironically, those laws led to an institutionaliza-
tion of the influence they sought to prevent. By imposing contribution
limitations, the 1974 FECA Amendments eliminated the key role of the
large donor. The effective fundraiser became crucial as candidates
were forced to broaden their financial bases. Individuals who had ac-
cess to networks of contributors from other campaigns or who pos-
sessed mailing lists to be prospected for potential donors became
critically important because they could raise a large amount of money
85. A recent phenomenon is the development of personal PACs by presidential candi-
dates and party leaders. These PACs contribute their funds to candidates favored by per-
sons sponsoring the PAC. Personal PACs might hinder party growth by focusing attention
on the person behind the PAC rather than on that person's party affiliation. More impor-
tantly, these PACs inevitably will compete with the parties for funds. For a discussion of
these PACs, see H. ALEXANDER, MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL REFORM 116-18, 193-
94 (3d ed. 1984).
86. A lengthy discussion of this process can be found in Alexander, The Casefor P,4Cs,
Public Affairs Council Monograph (1983).
87. This nationalizing effect that PACs have on campaign finance has prompted some
proposals to localize fundraising for congressional campaigns. See, e.g., MacGiehan, Con-
gressional Campaign Financing: The Debate Over PA4CInjuence (Feb., 1981) (self-published
article).
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through many contributions. But such "elite solicitors" are few and
direct mail solicitation of campaign funds is expensive.
PACs filled much of the void. Sponsored by corporations, unions,
or membership groups with political interests, these committees share
two characteristics important for effective fundraising: access to aggre-
gates of like-minded people and an internal means of communication.
PACs began to collect numerous small contributions, aggregate them,
and make contributions in larger, more meaningful amounts-all at no
cost to the preferred candidates.
There can be no doubt that PACs have become a major force in
the financing of political campaigns at the federal level. The adjusted
expenditures of all PACs rose from $19.2 million in 1972 to more than
$190 million in 1982.88 Contributions to congressional candidates dur-
ing the same period increased from about $8.5 million to $83.1 mil-
lion 89-a nearly ten-fold increase in ten years and approximately 50%
since 1980.90 One source reported that PACs contributed almost 28%
of the total congressional candidate receipts in 1982, an increase of ap-
proximately 20% from 1980.91 The proportions were higher in 1980 for
general election candidates compared with all congressional candi-
dates: Senate candidates received 20.7% and House candidates 28.9%
of their contributions from PACs. 2 Congressional incumbents in 1980
received slightly more than 30% of their contributions from PACs,
88. For example, according to the American Society of Association Executives, there
were 2,666 trade associations and professional societies with offices in the metropolitan
Washington area at the beginning of 1983, an increase of 65% since 1971. In the same
period, the number of such offices in New York declined 15%, to 2,568, and stayed about the
same in Chicago, with 868. See Pear, Richard Schweiker's New Employer, N.Y. Times, Jan.
14, 1983, at A16, col. 4.
89. The original Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1972), largely sought to rein in the power of special interests by increasing the amount of
financial disclosure. Political committees anticipating receipts of more than $1,000 during a
calendar year were required to file a statement of organization, report contributions and
expenditures of $100 or more, and required that any large contribution ($5,000 or more) be
reported within 48 hours after its receipt. See §§ 303, 304, 305 of the original legislation.
The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263, influenced by the large sums contributed by individuals and corporations to President
Nixon's re-election campaign, included various contribution and expenditure limits. See
supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
90. Section 101(b)(3) of the 1974 legislation provided that no individual could make
contributions aggregating $25,000 in a calendar year. Section 101(b)(1) limited individuals
to contributions of $1,000 to federal candidates in any election (primary, general, runoff, or
special).
91. 287b of Campaign Funds Came From PA Cs, PACs & LOBBIES 1 (Jan. 19, 1983).
92. J. CANTOR, supra note 6, at 77-78.
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while challengers received 19.9%.91 Even more significantly, those
elected to the House in 1980 received 42.8% of their campaign funds
from PACs.94 House candidates defeated in primaries received just
9.9% of their receipts from PACs.9 5
For many years critics of large contributions-whether their
source be individuals or PACs-have proposed the extension of public
financing to congressional campaigns. Efforts to enact such legislation
in the current climate of fiscal conservatism are unlikely to succeed.
Other critics seek to diminish the influence of PACs by lowering the
amount a PAC may contribute to a candidate and limiting the total
amount a candidate may receive from all PACs. One such measure,
the Obey-Railsback bill, would have limited the maximum PAC contri-
bution to House candidates to $3,000 per election and confined House
candidates to $70,000 in PAC contributions over a two-year election
cycle. 96
Legislation designed to restrict PAC contributions would be
counterproductive in the face of rising campaign costs and the unlikely
prospect that the budget conscious Ninety-eighth Congress would enact
legislation providing for alternative sources of funds. The burden of
such legislation would fall most heavily on challengers, who need large
campaign budgets to make themselves and their positions known, and
on candidates facing wealthy opponents spending personal funds on
their own campaigns. The labor and liberal committees would be the
PACs most hurt by legislation limiting PAC contributions. There are
more business PACs than labor PACs and more conservative PACs
than liberal PACs.97 To overcome the numerical advantage enjoyed by
their opposition, labor and liberal PACs would have to give larger av-
erage contributions. Furthermore, legislation restricting PAC contribu-
tions could significantly suppress the level of political speech in the
closing days of a highly competitive election. If one or more of the
candidates already has accepted and spent the total amount permitted,
he or she would be unable to make additional expenditures to respond
93. Id.; see FEC Releases FinalPACReportfor 1979-80 Election Cycle, supra note 8, at
3. When primary election challengers are included the figure drops to 15.7%. J. CANTOR,
supra note 6, at 77-78.
94. Roeder, PA4Cs 4mericana at D-1 (Sunshine Services Corp., 1982).
95. J. CANTOR, supra note 6, at 77-78.
96. H.R. 4970, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). This bill was passed by the House but the
Senate failed to act, and the bill died in the 96th Congress. For a discussion of the Obey-
Railsback bill, see H. ALEXANDER, supra note 83, at 26-30.
97. As of the end of 1983, some 1,536 corporate PACs were registered with the FEC, as
opposed to 378 labor PACs. See Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Releases New PAC Figures,
Press Release 1 (Jan. 20, 1984).
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to late developing issues. This problem could easily be exploited, or
perhaps created, at a critical juncture in a campaign by ideological and
single-issue independent expenditure committees.
Legislation which imposes aggregate limits on the amount of
money that congressional candidates can accept from PACs raises con-
stitutional questions of a different order from those implicated by either
contribution or expenditure limits. Such limits are, in effect, aggregate
receipt limits. Candidates would be forced to pick and choose among
proffered contributions to stay under the ceiling. Those unable to con-
tribute once the candidate's limit had been reached might have their
First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and association denied.
The overall limitation would do little to prevent corruption or the ap-
pearance of corruption.98 This restriction would not be a marginal in-
fringement on free speech because the rights of those who wish to
contribute to their preferred candidate would be completely elimi-
nated. In addition, if a candidate ran out of funds and was unable to
address late developing issues, such a law would infringe on the right of
society in general to hear political messages.
A better means of offsetting the influence of PACs would be to
increase the $1,000 annual individual contribution limit to $5,000 and
to repeal the annual $25,000 overall contribution limit for individuals.
This approach would counterbalance PAC contributions, reduce pres-
sure on candidates to solicit PAC donations, and compensate for the
effects of inflation upon the ability of individuals to participate finan-
cially in federal campaigns. The right of interest groups to organize to
influence the political process also would be respected. Finally, raising
the contribution limits for individuals would make independent expen-
diture committees less attractive to contributors because they could
provide greater direct support for the candidates of their choice.
Other indirect means of regulating special interest groups-
whether they be operating as PACs or otherwise-also exist and should
be preferred to tighter limits on giving. Legislation requiring meaning-
ful disclosure of lobbying should be enacted, including better means of
monitoring and publicizing lobbying efforts. With proper regulation,
civic organizations could be permitted to lobby for legislation under
restraints similar to those that govern corporations, labor unions, and
trade associations. 9 Extensive monitoring of lobbying undoubtedly
would be expensive. Less secrecy and a more open decisionmaking
98. See supra text following note 41 for a discussion of Buckler and the rules distilled
from the Buckley and Bellotti decisions.
99. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1974).
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process in both the Executive and Legislative branches would enable
civic organizations to participate more fully and effectively in the deci-
sionmaking process. A good first step would be to better publicize gov-
ernmental studies, regulatory agency rulings, and the date and location
of hearings.
Other means of indirectly restraining special interests without un-
due campaign restrictions are as follows: (1) broaden conflict of inter-
est laws as applied to government representatives; (2) minimize special
interest representation on regulatory commissions; (3) restrict the
movement of special interest representatives into government positions
and of government employees into related jobs in the private sector;
(4) make government procurement procedures more objective and sub-
ject to greater scrutiny, particularly those government contracts em-
ploying professionals such as consulting engineers and architects.
Conclusion
Ours is a pluralistic society in which every conceivable interest has
a right to organize and, once organized, to establish its own means of
seeking political influence. PACs represent an outgrowth of these
rights. What is needed are more broadly based groups to which candi-
dates can turn for the support they currently receive from narrowly
focused PACs.
Political parties have wide support and could act as intermediaries
between organized groups-whether special interest, public interest or
national interest-and policymakers. Political parties once served as
mediators and the revival of the Republican Party in the 1980 elections
indicates they can be strengthened to do so again. Parties could be
reinvigorated without altering the FECA by internal party reform
under the auspices of recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with na-
tional party conventions."w
The decline of parties is largely a story of missed opportunities. 101
100. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text. The Republican National Commit-
tee recently produced a report containing many suggestions for strengthening party struc-
tures and discipline. See Peterson, Republicans Look at the Future and See High Technology
and Tight Discipline, Wash. Post, July 2, 1981, at A7, col. 1. The Hunt Commission of the
Democratic National Committee also has suggested a number of intraparty changes. See
supra note 83 and accompanying text. The Democratic National Committee has accepted a
number of the Commission's recommendations, including the new delegate rules providing
for a larger role for the party leadership, a shortened primary calendar, and the reinstate-
ment of "loophole" primaries in which states may award delegates on a winner-take-all
basis.
101. In the many years that the Democratic Party controlled Congress, and occasionally
the White House, the party never built stable financial constituencies. Instead, the Demo-
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In part, however, party decline is a consequence of election reform
gone awry. Reform laws intended to increase citizen participation in
election campaigns and to decrease special interest influence have
served mainly to reinforce candidate-centered politics. The 1974
Amendments to the FECA imposed limitations on the amount of
money national and state party organizations could contribute to fed-
eral election campaigns'012 and established an annual limit on the
amount an individual could contribute to the national committee of a
political party. 0 3 The limits on party contributions per federal candi-
date are linked to in-kind expenditure limits on behalf of a federal can-
didate. 4 Independent expenditures by PACs are not limited to a
candidate; therefore, PACs can contribute more in the aggregate to a
given candidate than can the party on whose ticket the candidate runs.
A goal of future campaign reform should be to renew the major
political parties. 05 One step toward this end would be the elimination
of individual contribution limits to parties and the amounts parties
may contribute to candidates. An appealing aspect of this step is that
there would be no additional cost to the government.
Looking at 1984 and beyond, parties must work more closely with
candidates. The FECA has isolated candidates from their parties by
requiring disclosure of cost allocation when candidates join with each
other or with the party in campaign rallies or other joint activities. 10 6
The purpose of party politics is to bring people together, not to separate
them. 107
Currently, most candidates are not dependent on parties for their
campaign financing. Candidates raise their funds themselves, often re-
crats depended on labor support, large contributors, and the power of incumbency. The
Republican Party, particularly in the years of the Nixon presidency, has existed largely to
serve the needs of the party's presidential candidate, while problems faced by the party at
other levels suffered from inattention.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 608(f)(1), (2), (3) (1974). Some limits on state and local party commit-
tees subsequently were lifted for presidential campaigns by the 1979 Amendments to the
FECA. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(a)(B)(iv), (viii), (ix) (1976) (amended 1979).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1).
104. 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(d).
105. Efforts to strengthen the parties are certain to encounter opposition from PACs be-
cause candidates would need fewer direct PAC contributions and because PACs appear to
have assumed some of the traditional functions of parties.
106. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b).
107. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court grappled with the stifling effect of the
FECA disclosure provisions upon contributions to minor parties. The Court noted that mi-
nor parties may need to be released from the requirements if they can show "a reasonable
probability that the compelled disclosure. . . will subject them to threats, harrassment or
reprisals." 424 U.S. at 74. Such a showing was made in Brown v. Socialist Workers Party,
459 U.S. 87 (1982).
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lying on contributions from PACs. This gives PACs direct access to
successful candidates without the mediation of a party to accommodate
the conflicting claims of all the individuals and groups seeking to influ-
ence public policy. As a result, resolution of the national interest be-
comes difficult, if not impossible.
Strong political parties are integral to the formation of coherent
public policy. Modem parties can be based on democratic principles:
open discussion of issues presented from an interested perspective, but
seeking to accommodate conflicting concerns. Strong parties would
represent competing views of the public interest, worked out through
bargaining dynamics encompassing the party structure and the full
breadth of its component societal groupings.
There is danger if groups in a pluralistic society are overly re-
stricted in their political activity. Therefore, legislation should be di-
rected toward strengthening parties without restricting interest groups.
The First Amendment guarantees the right of association. Further-
more, individuals take cues from political groups with which they iden-
tify. Hence, there is a strong case for the continued existence of PACs
as aggregations of like-minded people whose political power is en-
hanced by combining forces. Political parties should not seek legisla-
tion to undermine interest groups. To be vigorous, competitive, and to
be successful in coalition-building, the parties should draw on the dy-
namics of interest group activity. In pluralism there is indeed strength
in numbers. Parties are designed to aggregate the diffused interests that
the wide range of PACs represent. Parties can and should work to seek
consensus among the diverse interests that PACs embody.

